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The usual assumption in economic analysis of law is that in a competi­
tive market without informational asymmetries, the terms of contracts 
between sellers and buyers will be optimal-that is, that any deviation from 
these terms would impose expected costs on one party that exceed benefits 
to the other. But could there be cases in which "one-sided" contracts­
contracts containing terms that impose a greater expected cost on one side 
than benefit on the other-would be found in competitive markets even in 
the absence of fraud, prohibitive information costs, or other market imper­
fections? That is the possibility we explore in this Article. 
We focus on the following asymmetry between seller and buyer in cases 
in which the latter is a consumer rather than another business or comparable 
entity: The seller in such a case may be deterred from behaving opportunis­
tically by considerations of reputation; the consumer is not constrained by 
such considerations because he has no reputation to lose, assuming that his 
opportunistic behavior in a particular transaction will not become known to 
the market as a whole. This difference is important whenever it is difficult to 
specify contractual terms to cover every important contingency that courts 
could accurately and easily enforce. In such circumstances, opportunistic 
buyers might try to use "balanced" terms to press for benefits and advan­
tages beyond those that the terms were actually intended to provide. 
Slanting the terms of the contract in favor of the seller is, we show, a 
way of redressing the balance. The existence of a one-sided contract does 
not imply that the transaction will be one-sided, but only that the seller will 
have discretion with respect to how to treat the consumer. A seller concerned 
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about its reputation can be expected to treat consumers better than is 
required by the letter of the contract. But the seller's right to stand on the 
contract as written will protect it against opportunistic buyers. A one-sided 
contract may thus be preferred ex ante by informed parties as a cheaper 
mechanism for inducing efficient outcomes, should contingencies arise dur­
ing the performance of the contract, than a more "balanced" contract that, 
because of imperfect enforcement, could create costs as a consequence of 
consumers' enforcing protective provisions in the contract. 
When firms are influenced by reputational considerations, contracts that 
appear on paper to be one-sided against the consumer may in reality be im­
plemented in a balanced way. The distinction between contracts on paper 
and their actual implementation is one that has received much attention from 
the literature on relational contracts between businesses.' As our analysis 
highlights, however, the distinction is also relevant to contracts that busi­
nesses enter into with consumers who are not repeat players. As long as the 
business is a repeat player with the consumer side of the market, its expecta­
tion of doing business with other consumers in the future may dissuade it 
from enforcing a one-sided contract to the hilt against a particular consumer 
even though the business does not expect to have further dealings with that 
consumer. 
I. EXPLAINING ONE-SIDED CONTRACTS 
We consider a competitive market in which sellers offer boilerplate con­
tracts that include terms that appear to impose on buyers expected costs that 
exceed expected benefits to the seller. Examples are pre-dispute mandatory­
arbitration clauses, holder-in-due-course clauses, forum selection clauses in 
cruise-ship ticket contracts, and shrink-wrap licenses. 
Contracts that contain such terms and, as is typical of such contracts, are 
offered to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis are described by critics as 
"contracts of adhesion." An older, and pretty well discredited, scholarly lit­
erature thought the absence of bargaining showed that the seller must have 
monopoly power, enabling him to foist on consumers whatever terms he 
liked. But transaction costs plus agency costs, relative to the modest stakes 
in most consumer transactions, are sufficient explanations for why sellers 
1. See, e.g, Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational 
Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in Merchant Coun: Rethink­
ing the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996). The paper 
closest to our analysis in its emphasis on problems of observability by courts is Benjamin Klein's 
analysis of franchise agreement. See Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" 
Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. EcON. REV. 356 (1980). 
In his contribution to this symposium, Jason Johnston seeks, like us, to analyze the distinction 
between the language and the actual implementation of contracts in the context of contracts between 
businesses and consumers. See Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory 
of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Con­
sumers, 104 MICH. L. REv. 857 (2006). The only prior paper of which we know to have explored 
this issue is Clay Gillette's study of rolling contracts that consumers enter into online. See Clayton 
P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679 (2004). 
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prefer a form contract to individual negotiations.
2 
Nor is it obvious why a 
monopolist would offer suboptimal terms rather than just charge a monop­
oly price for balanced terms, a price that would be higher because the 
consumer was receiving greater value.3 
But this leaves unexplained the one-sidedness of many form contracts. 
Scholars often try to explain them as a result of informational problems. 
Consumers could be inadequately informed about the provisions included in 
the contracts or their consequences.4 Consumers' understanding could also 
be distorted by the kind of cognitive problems that are receiving increasing 
attention from economists. 5 Or sellers could be induced to offer one-sided 
contracts by the presence of adverse selection, as we explain in Part IV.6 
Scholars who advance these explanations oppose judicial enforcement of 
contracts of adhesion in the name of unconscionability or similar doctrines.7 
S 
8 9 
ome courts have agreed, but most have not. 
Must the presence of one-sided contracts in competitive markets be due 
to informational problems? Are courts that enforce such contracts failing to 
intervene when they should? Or might there be an explanation that does not 
depend on assuming asymmetric information in favor of sellers or other 
possible sources of market failure? We show that such an explanation does 
exist and that, as a result, the normative inferences that can be drawn from 
such contracts are far from being clear and straightforward. 
Many one-sided contracts are found in consumer markets that have the 
following characteristics: The seller side of the market consists of repeat 
players who have a sunk cost in a reputation for dealing "fairly" with con­
sumers, in the sense of not taking advantage of one-sided terms as long as 
the consumer deals fairly with them. The buyer side of the market consists 
of parties that-because they do not have repeat dealings with particular 
2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 115 (6th ed. 2003). 
3. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Con­
tracts: An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements (NYU Law and Econ. Research 
Paper No. 05-11, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstracts=799274 (citing relevant sources). 
4. See, e.g., Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: ww and Eco-
nomics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 594-603 (1990). 
5. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004); see also 
Paul Bennett Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damages Clause: A Practical Appli­
cation of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REv. 27 (2001). 
6. See, e.g., Phillipe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Con-
tracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J .L. ECON. & 0RG. 381 (1990); Eric A. Posner, Contract ww in 
the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limita­
tions on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995). 
7. See, e.g., Meyerson, supra note 4, at 608-22. 
8. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); 
Galligan v. Arovitch, 219 A.2d 463 (Pa. 1966); Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996); State ex 
rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002); Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 
430 A.2d 638 (N.H. 1981) (per curiam). 
9. I E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 560-61 (2d ed. 
1998); see, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Seekings v. Jimmy 
GMC of Tuscon, Inc., 638 P.2d 210 (Ariz. 1981). 
830 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:827 
sellers (the market is competitive, so consumers can switch easily among 
sellers) and because privacy rules or other barriers to pooling of information 
among sellers prevent sellers from comparing notes about the behavior of 
individual buyers--do not have a sunk cost in reputation and hence have no 
incentive to deal fairly with sellers in the sense of honoring the terms of the 
contract. 
In such a situation, the optimal set of contract terms does not depend 
only on the relative costs and benefits associated with particular terms. It 
also depends on the relative propensity of the parties to behave opportunisti­
cally, that is, to take advantage of contractual terms and, in so doing, impose 
a cost on the other side that will exceed the benefit to the opportunistic 
party. 
In the asymmetric-reputation case, the seller has little or no incentive to 
behave opportunistically because if he does, he will suffer a loss of reputa­
tion, which is a cost. The buyer, however, is not deterred by concern for 
reputation. Nor is he dependably deterred by threat of legal action since, 
given feasibility limits on drafting contract terms that are free from uncer­
tainty, courts cannot always determine when a party is using a contract term 
opportunistically. 
In this situation, seemingly one-sided terms may not be one-sided after 
all. The expected cost of the term to the buyer must be discounted by the 
likelihood that reputational considerations will induce the seller to treat the 
buyer fairly even when such treatment is not contractually required. This 
cost will sometimes be further reduced by sellers' disinclination to sue con­
sumers even when they have an ethically as well as legally solid case. 
Sellers may still worry that a suit will injure their reputation for fair dealing 
(because the term is one-sided), or that the cost of the suit will be dispropor­
tionate to the expected benefit. If, therefore, we assume that a court would 
be able to determine only whether the litigated contract term is on average 
efficient-that is, on average, it burdens the bound party less than it benefits 
the obligee-a rule of unconscionability that condemned one-sided terms 
would systematically favor opportunistic buyers without protecting fair buy­
ers, because the latter are protected by the sellers' investment in reputation. 
Consider by way of example the following provision in the standard 
contract that Harvard University Press enters into with authors: "[i]f the Au­
thor fails to return the corrected proofs sheets by the date set by the 
Publisher, the Publisher may publish the Work without the Author's ap­
proval of proof."1° Clearly, given the importance of accuracy to the author, 
the publisher's enforcing this provision to the hilt would impose on the au­
thor an expected cost greater than the benefit to the publisher, especially 
given that the agreement does not limit the publisher's discretion in its 
choice of "the date set by the Publisher." 
What could explain the inclusion of this provision in an agreement re­
cently signed by this publisher and one of us and his co-author? It could not 
I 0. See Agreement Between Harvard University Press and Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse 
Fried (Mar. 23, 2004) (on file with authors). 
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be the publisher's market power. The publisher was seeking in this case, as 
in many others, to compete with other publishers on other aspects of the 
agreement. Nor could it have been the publisher's expectation that this pro­
vision would not be noticed by the authors. Authors are in general likely to 
read carefully the short publication agreement. Furthermore, the authors in 
this case did notice the provision and asked to amend it, but the publisher 
indicated that its policy was not to make amendments to this provision. 
Notwithstanding the publisher's insistence on retaining the provision, 
the publisher's agent assured th� authors that they do not have to worry 
about this provision and other seemingly one-sided provisions included in 
the agreement. Although this assurance had no legal significance, the au­
thors signed the agreement without worrying that the publisher would abuse 
the power given to it by the provision. Indeed, when the authors were a bit 
late in returning the proofs, the publisher, as expected, waited for the correc­
tions rather than enforcing the provision. 
Our explanation is that the provision is intended to protect the publisher 
from circumstances in which the author's delay in returning proofs is egre­
gious. But if the provision were explicitly limited to those circumstances, 
enforcement would be a difficult undertaking for a court because determin­
ing "egregiousness" might well depend on information available to the 
parties but not easily and accurately observable by the court. The one-sided 
provision obviates this concern, while the publisher's reputational interest 
protects the authors from the publisher's taking advantage of the literal 
meaning of the provision. 
In the circumstances we focus on, a one-sided provision allows the busi­
ness discretion whether to provide the individual with protection in any 
given circumstances. In contrast, because a balanced provision cannot be 
written in an unambiguous way, whether protection will be provided in any 
given circumstances will be influenced by the court's discretion. In some 
circumstances, a strategy of discretionary protection is superior to a strategy 
of judicial discretion. 
II. A SIMPLE MODEL 
Assume a competitive market in which one side (the seller side, consist­
ing of many sellers) faces stronger reputationa1 constraints than the other 
side does (the buying side, assumed to consist of many individual consum­
ers). The sellers are repeat-playing firms, and consumers have information 
about their behavior. As a result, sellers are concerned about their reputa­
tion. Buyers, however, are not concerned about investing in reputation 
because they buy infrequently from a given seller and sellers do not ex­
change information about consumers. 
In some markets, of course, buyers are not indifferent to their reputation. 
They may be firms that are repeat players with powerful incentives to pro­
tect their reputation, while the sellers may be individuals that transact 
infrequently. An example is the agreements that university presses have with 
new authors. Our analysis applies to such markets as well. It can explain, for 
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example, why the agreements that those presses have with their authors in­
clude provisions that seem one-sided against the author even though authors 
are likely to read the terms of these agreements and there is competition 
among the publishers. For simplicity of exposition, however, we will assume 
in the model that the sellers' side of the market is the one composed of firms 
with reputations to protect. 
Similarly, not all consumers are well informed about the behavior of 
sellers. Indeed, the cost of becoming informed may exceed the benefit, re­
sulting in rational ignorance of hidden traps in contracts that competition 
may not dispel.11 The novelty of the present analysis is that the same con­
tract forms that are widely assumed to be based on consumer ignorance can 
be shown to be consistent with competition under conditions of full infor­
mation. 
When a contract term is on average efficient, then each buyer's expected 
benefit, B, exceeds the seller's expected cost, C: C < B. But "on average" 
implies that the term won't be efficient in all the circumstances to which it 
literally applies. Assume it will be efficient in state 0, which has a probabil­
ity p of occurring, but not in any other state. Assume that the benefit to the 
buyer will be B2 > C in state 0 but only B1 < C in the non-0 state, so that the 
average benefit to the buyer is 
p(B2) + (l-p)(B1). 
Assume further that courts will be unable to observe whether the state of 
the world in which the contract dispute arises is 0, but the parties will, 
though all that is necessary for our analysis to hold is that the parties have 
better information about the presence or absence of e than courts have. 
Sellers in our model offer to buyers identical take-it-or-leave-it contracts 
and are not prepared to renegotiate when the time for performance arrives. 
One can think of the sellers as large firms that do not trust their agents to 
negotiate contract changes or (a point to which we'll return) that mistrust 
consumers who try to negotiate over terms. 
If a seller fails to comply with a contract term, the consumer will be able 
to obtain from a court an award of expectation damages equal to B. Because 
the court will not be able to distinguish perfectly between consumers who 
derive a large benefit from the term and consumers who derive only a small 
benefit, there will be a tendency to award damages equal to the average 
benefit of the contract term that the seller has violated. For the sake of sim­
plicity, we assume that the same damages are awarded in all cases in this 
class. 
Since B > C, if sellers' behavior is not constrained by their concern for 
their reputation, the protective term will be included, for without it the seller 
would have no incentive to confer B and so the value of the contract would 
not be maximized. Inclusion of the term produces an efficiency gain of B2-C 
11. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tux. L. 
REV. 1581, 1585-86 (2005). 
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in state 0 and an efficiency loss of C-B, in the non-0 state, but the net gain is 
positive because 
p(B2-C) + (1-p) (C-B1) = B-C > 0. 
Sellers in a competitive market will offer the term because while they 
will be charging a price for the contract that is higher by C (since that is the 
cost to the seller of the term), the expected benefit to consumers will be 
greater and so consumers will shun sellers who fail to offer it. 
This is the standard result when courts cannot observe the exact circum­
stances of a given case and there is no contract renegotiation; a term will be 
included if the average benefit exceeds the average cost. But it is no longer 
the case when reputational considerations are in play. For then, provided 
sellers' practices are known to consumers, sellers will offer only a contract 
that omits the term benefiting the buyer, but they will have a policy of hon­
oring the (nonexistent) term whenever the parties are in state 0. 
For example, the term might be that the buyer can return the good and 
get his money back, and 0 might be the state in which the buyer returns it 
promptly without having used or damaged it. Sellers will charge a price that 
is higher by pC because they expect to incur a cost C with probability p, in 
cases in 0. But buyers will have an expected benefit of pB2 and thus a net 
expected gain of p(B2-C). When some sellers offer such contracts while fol­
lowing the policy just described, no seller who fails to provide such a 
combination will be able to attract any consumers without losing money. 
It might seem that since buyers value the policy, sellers would make it a 
term of the contract even if they were constrained to follow the policy by 
their investment in reputation. But this is incorrect because, as a contract 
term, the policy would require adherence by the seller even when it was in­
efficient to provide the benefit, that is, even when the parties were in the 
non-0 state. Thus, if the contract provided that the buyer could return the 
good if dissatisfied with it, the seller would be obligated to accept the return 
even if the buyer, rather than actually being dissatisfied with it, had used it 
as much as he wanted to or had damaged it so that it was no longer valuable 
to him. Of course, the seller might include some qualifying language such as 
"reasonably dissatisfied," but the uncertainty created by such language 
would give the buyer some probability of being able to get away with re­
turning the good in circumstances not intended to be covered by the clause. 
III. POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
Our analysis has both positive and normative implications. On the posi­
tive side, it can explain the large number of cases in which sellers 
dependably treat consumers much better than their contracts require them to 
do. Sellers often accept returns in circumstances in which they are not obli­
gated to do so. Similarly, hotels usually do not charge a guest for checking 
out of his room shortly after the check-out time; publishers commonly do 
not send a manuscript to the printer without waiting for the author's correc­
tions when the author is late and usually overlook other small breaches as 
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well; airlines sometimes give people double mileage credit if a flight is de­
layed; and restaurants allow substitutions though the menu states "no 
substitutions." Such concessions are not properly regarded as advertising or 
price discrimination, because consumers expect them and often would be 
indignant if they were withheld. 
B ut because they are not legal entitlements, the seller is not at the mercy 
of a buyer who would abuse them but not be amenable to legal sanctions. 
Suppose, for example, that instead of fixing a rigid check-out time, the con­
tract between a hotel and its guests provided that the guest must leave at the 
check-out time (or pay for another day) unless he has good cause to delay 
his departure for a reasonable amount of time. Such a provision could be 
(ab)used by a guest who decides cavalierly to stay in the room, watching 
TV, until the evening news. With the rigid check-out rule, the hotel will be 
able to charge this overstaying customer for another day while waiving such 
charges routinely for customers who miss the check-out time in good faith 
and for good reason. 
In the circumstances that we study in this Article, courts would do well 
to take a hard line in enforcing the terms of one-sided consumer contracts in 
the absence of evidence of fraud. Suppose the contract that a seller has with 
its customers does not promise them some protection X (say, forgiving 
charging for an entire day in the event of a short delay in checking out due 
to circumstances beyond a customer's control), but there is evidence that the 
seller does commonly accord them X. Should a court view the common 
practice as an implicit promise to do so? Our answer is no, because this 
would sacrifice the benefits of an unenforceable policy that allows the firm 
discretion to withhold a normally expected benefit. 
There will be borderline cases because courts frequently use evidence of 
past practice or custom to interpret a contract. However, this is done mainly 
in cases in which a contractual term is ambiguous. 12 If the term is crystal 
clear, as the drafters of one-sided contracts will endeavor to make it, courts 
will generally enforce the term as written. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION-BASED EXPLANATIONS 
We enlarge briefly here on the alternative explanations mentioned earlier 
for one-sided contracts. These explanations are based on informational 
asymmetries between sellers and buyers. One explanation assumes that con­
sumers are at an informational disadvantage. They are uninformed about the 
costs that the contract may impose upon them or suffer from cognitive limi­
tations and biases when assessing these costs. 
The other explanation assumes that there are two types of consumer be­
tween which the seller cannot distinguish; in other words, consumers have 
the informational advantage. One type, who would value a protective provi­
sion more than the other, also happens to be the one that is costlier to serve. 
12. I MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 24.7, 24.9 (Joseph M. Perillo 
ed., rev. ed. 1998). 
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In these circumstances, even if the protective provision is efficient for all 
consumers, in equilibrium, no consumer might ask for it out of fear that do­
ing so would make the seller suspect that the buyer was of the type that is 
costlier to serve. 
Our explanation for one-sided contracts has two different implications, 
one positive and one normative, from those of the alternative, information­
based explanations.
13 The distinctive positive implication is that when our 
explanation is applicable, firms will not take advantage of the one-sided 
contracts: only in exceptional cases will they stand by the letter of the con­
tract. In contrast, when one of the two information-based explanations 
applies, firms will always (or at least almost always) stick to the letter of the 
contract. 
The normative implication is that when our explanation is applicable, 
the law should not intervene and provide protection not supplied by the con­
tract, while if the seller has and is exploiting an informational advantage, 
there is an argument for implying protective provisions in the contract to 
make it less one-sided. Similarly, in the presence of inefficient pooling pro­
duced by adverse selection, imposing protective provisions could sometimes 
(though not always) improve matters. The challenge for future research is to 
try to distinguish between the domains of our explanation and the informa­
tion-based explanations. 
We emphasize finally that our analysis is limited to the case of repetitive 
selling of consumer products under conditions of good consumer informa­
tion about sellers. With infrequent sales or poor information about sellers, 
sellers will not be constrained by reputational concerns. Our analysis is 
likewise inapplicable when the buying side consists not of individual con­
sumers, but of firms that have their own reputational stake in fair dealing, so 
that sellers have less concern about being taken advantage of by buyers who 
are not reputation-constrained. It is the asymmetry of reputation concerns in 
the case of the repeat seller selling to a consumer that drives our analysis. 
The potential existence of such asymmetries is a factor to which scholars 
and judges should, we contend, pay close attention. 
13. There is a sense in which our explanation is information-based too; but the information 
deficit in our analysis is not a deficit of either party to the contract, but of the court that may be 
called upon to enforce the contract. 
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